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Abstract 
The relationship between working memory and deliberative 
processing was examined in a human contingency learning 
experiment that employed the combined positive and negative 
patterning procedure of Shanks and Darby (1998). 
Participants with a large working memory capacity showed 
generalization consistent with the application of an opposites 
rule (i.e., a compound and its elements signal opposite 
outcomes), whilst individuals with a small working memory 
capacity showed generalization consistent with surface 
similarity. Working memory capacity was assessed via the 
Operation Span task (Turner & Engle, 1989). Implications for 
associative, inferential, and dual-process accounts of human 
learning are discussed.                 
Keywords: rules; associative learning; generalization; 
working memory; deliberative processing. 
Introduction 
The distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative 
processing, under a variety of different names, is 
fundamental to the study of cognition. For example, 
theorists seek to distinguish between propositional and 
associative learning (Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 
2009), between analytic and nonanalytic categorization 
(Brooks, 1978), between automatic and intentional retrieval 
from memory (Jacoby, 1991), and between intuitive and 
deliberate reasoning (Kahneman, 2003).  Deliberative 
processing is generally considered to be characteristic of 
thought processes that go beyond surface similarity to 
extract casual (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003) or abstract 
(Shanks & Darby, 1998) structure, thought processes that go 
beyond simple familiarity to episodic recollection (Jacoby, 
1991), thought processes that are able to detect and correct 
irrational non-deliberative inferences (Kahneman, 2003). 
Deliberative thought processes are also often considered to 
be those that involve a degree of recurrence – in the sense 
that one goes through a series of intermediate stages to 
arrive at the final response (Milton & Wills, 2004). Another, 
related, way of capturing this idea of recurrence is to say 
that deliberative thought approximates the operation of a 
physical symbol system (Newell, 1980) – the ideas are 
related because certain recurrent, neural-like, structures 
have been shown to be able to implement a Universal 
Turing Machine (Siegelmann & Sontag, 1995). 
In the current study we investigated the relationship 
between the availability of working memory resources and 
the extent to which people engage in deliberative processing 
when acquiring new information. People with comparatively 
large working memories learn some tasks more quickly (e.g. 
learning to trace electrical signals through logic gates; 
Kyllonen & Stephens, 1990), and other tasks more slowly 
(e.g. acquisition of a hard-to-verbalize category structure; 
De Caro, Thomas & Beilock, 2008; but see Tharp & 
Pickering, 2009), than people with comparatively small 
working memories. In the current study, we were interested 
primarily in the relationship between availability of working 
memory resources and the nature of what was learned. 
One related study is that by De Houwer and Beckers 
(2003). In their forward cue competition experiment, 
participants first observed (in a computer game scenario) 
that firing a particular weapon (A) was followed by the 
destruction of a tank. Later on, weapon A was fired 
simultaneously with a new weapon, B. This compound 
firing also led to the destruction of the tank. They were then 
asked about the causal status of weapon B with respect to 
the destruction of the tank. On one, non-deliberative, 
account weapon B and the destruction of the tank have been 
repeatedly paired and thus one might say weapon B causes 
destruction of the tank by the mere fact of contiguity. 
However on another, deliberative, account one might argue 
that the causal status of B is uncertain because A causes 
destruction of the tank on its own, and B has never been 
used on its own. De Houwer and Beckers found that the 
imposition of a concurrent working memory load led to 
higher ratings for the extent to which B was considered to 
cause the tank’s destruction, compared to a situation where 
the same contingencies were observed in the absence of a 
concurrent load. Their conclusion was that the imposition of 
a concurrent load interfered with the deliberative (deductive 
reasoning) processes required to work out that the causal 
status of B was uncertain, despite the fact it had been 
repeatedly paired with the destruction of the tank. 
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In another related study, Waldron and Ashby (2001) 
demonstrated that concurrent working memory load 
retarded the acquisition of category structures definable in 
terms of a simple (single-attribute) rule, whilst the 
acquisition of category structures for which the rule was 
complex and non-intuitive was not significantly affected by 
concurrent load. Waldron and Ashby concluded that 
concurrent load interfered with the deliberative (rule-based) 
categorization process that would normally dominate in the 
simple-rule case, but that concurrent load left unaffected the 
non-deliberative processes underlying the acquisition of the 
more complex category structure. 
One of the inherent difficulties in attempting to 
demonstrate a relationship between the availability of 
working memory resources and the extent to which learning 
proceeds deliberatively is to find a type of learning behavior 
that is unambiguously outside the scope of non-deliberative 
theories of cognition. For example, Nosofsky and Kruschke 
(2002) have argued that the results of Waldron and Ashby 
(2001) can be accounted for by a non-recurrent, non-
deliberative, exemplar model (ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992). 
The basis of Nosofsky and Kruschke’s argument is that 
concurrent load may be hypothesized to disrupt learned 
selective attention. This disruption will affect learning tasks 
in which selective attention is helpful (such as categories 
defined by a single attribute). Forward cue competition is 
also, at least in part, the result of learned selective attention 
(Kruschke, Kappeman & Hetrick, 2005; Wills, Lavric, Croft 
& Hodgson, 2007), so the idea that concurrent load disrupts 
selective attention might also, in principle, account for the 
forward cue competition results of De Houwer and Beckers 
(discussed above). 
In the current studies, we examined the role of working 
memory in the learning and generalization task introduced 
by Shanks and Darby (1998). The task is unusual in that the 
performance of a subset of participants in this task is widely 
considered to be strong evidence for the role of deliberative 
processing in learning. This view is held both by those who 
argue for a central role of non-deliberative (associative) 
processes in human learning (e.g. Cobos, Almaraz & 
Garcia-Madruga, 2003), and for those who argue against 
this position (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2009). Verguts and Fias 
(2009) have argued that the behavior of this subset of 
participants can be accounted for by a recurrent 
connectionist model – this argument is consistent with the 
position, outlined above, that recurrence is a characteristic 
feature of deliberative processing and that recurrent network 
architectures can implement general-purpose computational 
systems. 
The design and key result of Shanks and Darby (1998) is 
shown in Figure 1. Participants were asked to take the role 
of an allergist, attempting to predict which foods will cause 
an allergic reaction in a hypothetical patient, Mr. X. In 
Figure 1, letters stand for foods, “+” indicates the presence 
of an allergic reaction, and “-“ indicates the absence of an 
allergic reaction. The training phase contained two complete 
positive patterning problems (e.g. A+, B+, AB-) and two 
complete negative patterning problems (e.g. C-, D-, CD+). 
Training also contained four incomplete patterning 
problems (e.g. participants see I+ and J+ but not IJ). The 
critical results concern participants’ generalization to novel 
items, such as IJ, in the absence of feedback. For example, 
say you have observed that Mr. X develops an allergic 
reaction when he eats ice cream (I) and when he eats jelly 
(J). Do you predict the presence or absence of an allergic 
reaction when eating ice cream and jelly together? 
A non-deliberative, surface similarity, process is likely to 
predict allergic reaction to IJ, as IJ is similar to both I and J, 
both of which produced an allergic reaction. A deliberative 
process, however, might detect that an opposites rule 
succinctly captures the information available during training 
– single foods produce the opposite reaction to their 
compounds. On this basis, IJ is predicted to not result in an 
allergic reaction, because this is the opposite outcome to 
that for I occurring on its own (and for J occurring on its 
own). As shown in Figure 1, Shanks and Darby found that 
participants who achieved a high level of accuracy during 
training showed generalization consistent with the 
 
 
Figure 1: A. The training and test trial types in the Shanks and Darby (1998, Experiment 2) allergy prediction task; letters 
indicate foods eaten by a hypothetical patient Mr. X, + = patient develops an allergic reaction; - = patient does not develop 
an allergy reaction; ? = no feedback given. B. Critical test trials of Shanks and Darby (1998, Experiment 2) – probability 
of participants predicting an allergic reaction in Mr. X to novel meals, as a function of accuracy in the training phase. 
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application of an opposites rule, while participants who 
performed less well in training showed generalization 
consistent with surface similarity. Our hypothesis is that this 
transition in generalization reflects a transition from non-
deliberative to deliberative processing during the course of 
training. We further hypothesize that, if opposites-rule and 
surface-feature generalization are indeed the products of 
deliberative and non-deliberative processing respectively, 
then the availability of working memory resources should 
determine whether opposites-rule or surface-feature 
generalization is seen (under the assumption that 
deliberative processing makes greater demands on working 
memory than non-deliberative processing). 
Existing evidence could be employed, in a fairly indirect 
manner, to argue either for, or against, our hypothesis. On 
the one hand, Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin and Shanks 
(2005) demonstrated that opposites-rule generalization was 
related to performance on Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
(RPM). RPM are considered to be a measure of general 
intelligence (g) and g appears to be related to working 
memory capacity (Conway, Kane & Engle, 2003). Hence 
one might argue that those with high working memory 
capacity should be more likely to show opposites-rule 
generalization than those with low working memory 
capacity. On the other hand, De Houwer and Vandorpe 
(2009) demonstrated performance consistent with opposites-
rule generalization in the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Although a matter 
of some debate (Fazio & Olson, 2003), the IAT (as its name 
suggests) is often considered to index non-deliberative 
processing. Also, opposites-rule generalization is related to 
participants demonstrating an inverse base-rate effect 
(Winman et al., 2005), yet demonstration of an inverse base-
rate effect has been reported to be unaffected by a 
concurrent load (Lamberts & Kent, 2007). 
In the current article, we examined the relationship 
between working memory and deliberative processing in 
two ways. We measured individuals’ working memory 
using an Operation Span task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 
1989) and tested the hypothesis that those with relatively 
large working memory capacity would show generalization 
more consistent with the application of an opposites rule, 
whilst individuals with a relatively small working memory 
capacity would show generalization more consistent with 
surface similarity.  
Experiment 
Method 
 
Participants and apparatus. Forty-two adults from the 
Exeter and Guernsey regions of the United Kingdom took 
part on a voluntary basis. They were tested individually in a 
quiet testing room using a PC laptop (17” screen) running 
the E-prime software package (Version 1.1, Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, USA).  
 
Design and stimuli (learning task). The design of the 
learning task is shown in Figure 1A. For half the 
participants the foods A-P were, respectively, coconut, 
cheese, apple, orange, carrots, cabbage, chips, nuts, eggs, 
banana, beetroot, rice, milk, and garlic. For the remaining 
participants, the foods assigned to A and B were swapped 
with those assigned to C and D, and similarly for E/F and 
G/H, for I/J and K/L, and for M/N and O/P.  
 
Procedure. Participants were asked to assume the role of an 
allergist, predicting whether a hypothetical patient, Mr. X, 
would or would not develop an allergic reaction after eating 
a meal containing certain foods. On each trial, food names 
were presented on the screen, and participants pressed a key 
to indicate whether or not Mr. X would suffer an allergic 
reaction. No time limit was set for these responses. During 
the training phase, each trial was followed by a feedback 
message of 1500ms duration (e.g. “Correct! Mr. X 
developed an allergic reaction”). No feedback was given 
during the test phase. The training phase comprised eight 
blocks; each block contained two of each of the 18 training 
trial types shown in Figure 1A, presented in a random order. 
The test phase comprised two of each of the 24 test trial 
types shown in Figure 1A, again presented in a random 
order. The transition between blocks and phases was not 
signaled to participants, although they were forewarned that 
feedback would not be available towards the end of the 
experiment. 
After a short break (1-2 minutes), the participants 
proceeded to the operation span (OSPAN) task. In this task, 
participants were presented with a total of 60 trials split into 
15 groups of trials. There were 3 groups each of 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6 trials and participants were presented with the groups 
of trials in a pseudo-random order. Each trial consisted of a 
simple mathematical equation (e.g. 2 x 3 + 1 = 7) presented 
simultaneously with a word (e.g. BED). The participant’s 
task was to indicate whether the answer to the equation was 
correct or incorrect. They were also required to remember 
each word. Each equation/word combination was response 
terminated with a timeout of 5 seconds. At the end of each 
group of trials, participants were asked to recall, in order, 
the words presented within that group. For example, in a 
block size of 3, participants would be presented with three 
equation/word pairs. After the presentation of the third pair, 
participants would be asked to recall the first word in the 
group followed by the second word and finally, the third 
word. Participants were not allowed to backtrack and 
change a previously given answer. There was no limit 
placed on time for recall, and no feedback was given. A 
participant’s score on the OSPAN task was calculated as the 
sum of correctly recalled words for trial groups that were 
perfectly recalled (e.g. Conway & Engle, 1994; Turner & 
Engle, 1989).  
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The operation span task proper was preceded by three 
practice spans (all of length two) to familiarize participants 
with the task. These practice spans were not analyzed.  
Results 
Our hypothesis was that those with a high working memory 
capacity (as measured by the OPSAN task) would show 
generalization consistent with an opposites rule, whilst 
participants with a low working memory capacity would 
show generalization consistent with surface similarity. High 
and low working memory capacity was operationalized as 
the upper and lower quartiles of the sample on the OSPAN 
score (Conway & Engle, 1994).  
Figure 2 (left panel) illustrates the generalization to novel 
compounds MN and IJ, as a function of high vs. low 
OSPAN. An ANOVA with one between-subjects factor 
(high vs. low span), and one within-subjects factor 
(stimulus; MN vs. IJ), revealed a significant interaction 
between these factors, F(1,20) = 15.87, p = 0.001. The main 
effects of span and stimulus were not significant, F(1,20) < 
2.55, p > 0.10. Under an opposites rule, the appropriate 
response to MN is that an allergic reaction is expected, and 
the appropriate response to IJ is that an allergic reaction is 
not expected. Under the application of surface similarity, the 
predictions are reversed. The generalization to novel 
compounds MN and IJ shown by high working memory 
capacity participants is therefore more consistent with the 
application of an opposites rule, whilst the generalization 
shown by low working memory capacity participants is 
more consistent with the application of surface similarity. 
Figure 2 (right panel)  illustrates a similar result for novel 
test stimuli K/L and O/P although, as in Shanks and Darby 
(1998), the interaction is marginally significant, F(1,20) = 
3.91, p = 0.06. The main effects are non-significant, F(1,20) 
< 1.  
Performance on familiar test items (i.e. those also seen 
during training) was consistent with the feedback received 
during training, for both groups. High OSPAN participants 
predicted an allergic reaction on 92% of occasions for 
stimuli that had been associated with allergy in training, and 
predicted an allergic reaction on 13% of occasions for 
stimuli that had not been associated with allergy in training. 
For low OSPAN participants, the figures were 71% and 
39%. An ANOVA with one within-subjects factor (stimulus 
type: allergy vs. no allergy) and one between-subjects factor 
(high vs. low working memory) revealed a main effect of 
stimulus type, F(1, 20) = 67.3, p < 0.0005, and a significant 
interaction, F(1, 20) = 11.9, p = 0.003.  There was no main 
effect of group, F(1,20) < 1. The significant interaction 
reflects more accurate performance on familiar items by the 
high working memory capacity participants. 
Discussion 
We found that participants with a comparatively large 
working memory capacity generalized to novel stimuli in a 
learning task (Shanks & Darby, 1998) in a way consistent 
with the application of an abstract rule, whilst participants 
with a comparatively small working memory capacity 
generalized to novel stimuli in a way consistent with surface 
similarity. Those participants with a large working memory 
capacity also learned more quickly than those with a small 
working memory capacity. Both positive (Kyllonen & 
Stephens, 1990), and negative (DeCaro et al., 2008) 
relationships between working memory capacity and rate of 
learning have been reported in other tasks. 
The learning task employed in these studies was 
introduced by Shanks and Darby (1998). The task is unusual 
in that there is a broad consensus, from a range of 
theoretical perspectives, that the abstract-rule generalization 
seen in this task is outside the scope of non-deliberative 
thought processes (e.g. those processes captured by simple 
associative, and non-recurrent connectionist, models; Cobos 
et al., 2003; De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; Mitchell et al., 
2009; Verguts & Fias, 2009). The consensus concerning the 
Shanks and Darby task stands in contrast to the contentious 
nature of some other forms of putatively deliberative 
behavior that have been reported in adults (e.g. DeCaro et 
al., 2008 vs. Tharp & Pickering, 2009).  
The explanation we tentatively offer for our results is that 
participants initially approach the training phase through a 
process of exemplar storage and retrieval. This is a 
relatively non-deliberative process (which is not to say it is 
necessarily entirely automatic). Later in training, some 
participants notice there is a non-intuitive rule that 
substantially reduces the number of things one has to 
remember. At limit, all one needs to remember is the rule 
that compounds predict the opposite to their elements, and 
that the compounds CD, EF, and KL make Mr. X sick. 
Everything else can be derived – for example, A on its own 
will make Mr.X sick, because A is not in any of the three 
compounds that make him sick (CD, EF, KL), and 
compounds predict the opposite to their elements. 
This process of rule extraction is assumed to be relatively 
deliberative and effortful, requiring as it does the generation 
of verbal hypotheses and then testing them against 
subsequently presented training items. If the process of rule 
extraction is assumed to be relatively deliberative and 
 
 
Figure 2: mean probability of participants predicting an 
allergic reaction in response to novel stimuli IJ, MN, O/P 
(the mean of responses to O and P), and K/L, shown as a 
function of participants’ working memory capacity 
(upper vs. lower quartile). 
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effortful, then it is not unreasonable to assume it might be 
more likely to occur in those with a relatively large working 
memory. Generalization to novel test items will depend on 
the nature of the representations developed during training. 
For those with a small working memory capacity, the 
representations are exemplars, and generalization would 
therefore be expected to be on the basis of surface 
similarity. Those with a large working memory, however, 
extract the opposites rule, and generalization might 
therefore be expected to be on the basis of that opposites 
rule.  
The idea that rule extraction in the Shanks-Darby task is 
deliberative, effortful, and requiring of working memory 
resources, is also supported by related work in our 
laboratory. Across two experiments, Wills, Graham, Koh, 
McLaren and Rolland (2011) demonstrated that the 
imposition of a concurrent working memory load during the 
training phase of the Shanks-Darby task resulted in 
similarity-based generalization during the test phase. In the 
absence of concurrent working memory load during 
training, participants produced opposites-rule 
generalization. Opposites-rule generalization in the absence 
of  load was to be expected in these experiments as 
participants were trained to a high criterion  (89% 
accuracy); those not meeting the criterion were excluded 
from analysis. Interestingly, Wills et al. (2011) found that 
the presence of concurrent working memory load during the 
test phase had no effect. Hence, it appears to be the 
extraction of a rule in this task that requires substantial 
working memory resources, rather than the application of an 
extracted rule. It may be that substantial working memory 
resources are required to generate and/or evaluate a rule that 
summarizes (and hence simplifies) the information 
presented during training. 
The explanation we offer for our results falls amongst the 
broad class of explanations that assume cognition in adult 
humans is the product of at least two systems – one system 
that is deliberative, and perhaps approximates the function 
of a physical symbol system (Newell, 1980), and another 
system that is non-deliberative, and which might be 
approximated by a simple associative system. Explanations 
of this general class include those forwarded by Ashby et al. 
(1998), Brooks (1978), and Sloman (1996).  
In addition to dual-process accounts of human cognition, 
another class of theory is that all learning is the product of a 
deliberative system (e.g. inferential accounts; Mitchell et al., 
2009). In relation to the results of the current experiments, 
inferential accounts would presumably assume that not only 
opposites-rule performance, but also surface similarity 
performance, was the product of an inferential process in 
this task. In order to predict any effect of working memory 
capacity, such an account must assume that opposites-rule 
performance is more effortful than surface similarity 
performance – perhaps because participants arrive with a 
pre-experimental hypothesis that similar meals lead to 
similar outcomes, whilst the non-intuitive opposites-rule 
hypothesis is only arrived at through a relatively effortful 
process of hypothesis-testing during training. Having a 
relatively limited working memory capacity presumably 
interferes with this process, leaving the participant with just 
memory for the examples (which is employed for familiar 
test items) and a pre-experimental surface similarity 
hypothesis (which is employed for novel test items).  
In summary, an inferential explanation seems to need to 
assume both the presence of a relatively non-deliberative 
exemplar storage and retrieval process, and that certain 
types of inferential process are also relatively non-
deliberative (e.g. inferences on the basis of a pre-
experimental hypothesis about novel test items). In other 
words, an inferential explanation seems to need to assume 
the presence of not only relatively non-effortful forms of 
learning and retrieval, but also the presence of relatively 
non-effortful forms of inference. When expressed in those 
terms, an inferential account seems to largely converge with 
the dual-process we offer above.  
In summary, we have reported an experiment that 
suggests the availability of working memory resources is an 
important determinant of how we generalize from what we 
have learned. In our studies, information learned and tested 
in the presence of substantial working memory resources 
seems to lead to generalization more consistent with the 
application of an abstract rule, whilst information learned 
and tested in the presence of more limited working memory 
capacity seems to lead to generalization more consistent 
with surface similarity. 
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